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I too would like to commend Joe Lynch’s marvelous history of the 
beginnings of the debates over the Constitution.  I think he would have 
made a good reporter during that period of time, better possibly than Mr. 
Madison, who made rather sketchy notes.  Be that as it may, I was struck at 
the outset of the book when I got to page four and found a remark that got 
me all excited.  He describes the Necessary and Proper Clause1 as a 
“masterpiece of enigmatic formulation.”2  Well, I have long been a devotee 
and a pursuer of the Necessary and Proper Clause so I was anxious to get 
further into this “enigmatic” formulation. 
One of the first things I did after reading Joe’s book was to look for 
another authoritative evaluation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and I 
came upon a seminar, a forum presided over by our friend Professor 
Levinson five or six years ago, entitled Constitutional Stupidities.3  I hope 
he does not think this is a second session of the Constitutional Stupidities 
forum, but in that forum one of the speakers addressed the subject of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause under the title of “Unnecessary and 
Unintelligible.”4 
Chief Justice Marshall also addressed the meaning of the word 
“necessary.” According to Marshall, it does not mean absolutely  
necessary—it means what Congress thinks is proper or appropriate for the 
occasion, but not absolutely necessary. 
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 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or office thereof.”). 
 2 JOSEPH M. LYNCH ,  NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT 4 (1999) (“All the evidence points to the conclusion that in composing the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Committee of Detail drafted a compromise, a masterpiece 
of enigmatic formulation . . . .”). 
 3 See Symposium, Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST.  COMMENT. 139 (Summer 
1995). 
 4 See Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST.  COMMENT. 167 
(Summer 1995).   
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Well, that reminded me of when I was serving as a law clerk to Chief 
Justice John Marshall.  He came to me one morning in 1819 and said, 
“Here’s a draft of my opinion in the McCulloch5 case, which was argued 
recently.  What do you think of it?” 
Well I looked at it overnight and the next day I said, “Chief, there’s 
one thing you might want to add in defining the word ‘necessary.’  Why 
don’t you look at some of the other provisions in the Constitution that use 
the word ‘necessary’.” 
“What do you mean?” he asked. 
I replied, “Look at Article Five, which says that the ‘The Congress, 
whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to the Constitution . . . .’6  Well, obviously the word 
‘necessary’ there cannot not be construed to mean it’s absolutely necessary. 
If it was, there would be no discretion whatsoever left to the Congress in 
deciding when to propose amendments.” 
“Here’s another one Chief,” I continued, “why can’t you point out in 
Section 3 of Article II, where it says that the ‘President shall, from time-to-
time, give Congress Information on the State of the Union and recommend 
to their Considerations such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.’7  That’s another provision of the Constitution that supports the 
way you’re using the word ‘necessary’ in this McCulloch opinion.” 
“Well, is there anything else you’ve found?” he asked. 
I said, “Yes, Chief.  The real clincher comes in Article I, Section 10.  
If you’d just read down a few sentences beyond the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, what do you find?  This is a good one: “No State shall, without the 
consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection law.”8 
“There you have a variety of different meanings that you can give to 
the word ‘necessary.’  Obviously, you’re right, Chief, just the word 
‘necessary’ standing by itself does not mean absolutely necessary.  That 
fact was proved beyond a shadow of a doubt when the drafters of the 
Constitution used the words ‘absolutely necessary’ when they meant 
‘absolutely necessary.’” 
Well, I believe that the Chief followed some of my suggestions about 
the other constitutional usages of the word “necessary.”9 In any event, the 
Chief’s opinion was to become the first and the official interpretation of the 
 
 5 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 9 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-17. 
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words “necessary and proper.”  And let me again put that in the context of 
the actual language of the Necessary and Proper Clause which says: 
“Congress shall have the Power . . . to make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing  
Powers . . . .”10  Now that refers to the vertical or foregoing enumeration of 
powers in Article 1, Section 8.  There are seventeen express enumerated 
powers of Congress.11  Congress is in the eighteenth clause given the power 
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into 
execution”12 the foregoing seventeen express powers and “all other Powers 
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”13  That’s the horizontal thrust of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause—empowering Congress to enact laws to 
execute the powers that may be granted to the federal government under 
Article II or under Article III or any other article in the original 
Constitution. 
Now, significantly—and I think Joe Lynch points this out incisively—
the great debate during and after the Constitutional Convention was over 
the extent of this power to enact laws which shall be “necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution” all of these horizontal and vertical powers.  
Did that give Congress complete discretion to go far beyond anything 
anybody ever dreamed of and enact any law, or should they be confined to 
enacting laws to carry into execution the specific enumerated powers?  This 
was the great debate between Hamilton and the Madison groups and it was 
never really resolved.14 
There was, as Professor Lynch’s book reports, little discussion or 
debate on what the limitations are, if any, on the use of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to enact appropriate legislation. 
There was one effort made by Pierce Butler of South Carolina, one of 
the original members of the Committee of Detail that actually composed 
the “necessary and proper” language.  At one point he suggested a 
substitute for the Necessary and Proper Clause.15  He essentially wanted the 
words “and proper” eliminated to leave only “necessary,” making the 
provision read something like: “To make all laws not repugnant to this 
Constitution that may be necessary for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers,” or something like that.16  Butler’s idea was never 
 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See LYNCH , supra note 2, at 19. 
 15 See LYNCH , supra note 2, at 20-22. 
 16 See id. at 20. 
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formally presented, let alone acted upon by the Convention, but it is 
significant that somebody at least realized that there must be some 
limitation to this power to enact “necessary and proper” laws. 
Well, I think the Chief recognized all this in his McCulloch opinion 
because he goes on to develop critical limitations on the power of Congress 
to enact “necessary and proper” laws.  He did so, not by limiting the word 
“necessary” but by creating an independent three-part test for determining 
what laws are possible under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  As you 
will remember from your constitutional law class, the test is: “Let the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”17 
Now, the Court has often utilized that definition is assessing the 
constitutionality of a given “necessary and proper” statute.18 They perhaps 
have not always followed it to the letter, but this McCulloch three-part test 
has placed an important limitation on the power of Congress to enact laws 
that are “necessary and proper”:  Such laws must be “consistent” with all 
other provisions of the Constitution.   
There have been some interpretive changes lately that I want to 
comment upon, but before I do, there is one additional fact about Chief 
Justice Marshall’s test that is very interesting.  Justice Brennan in 
Katzenbach vs. Morgan,19 back in 1966, borrowed the “necessary and 
proper” test that Marshall used in his McCulloch opinion and imported it 
into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,20 so that when Congress 
passes a statute to enforce any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
too must be consistent with all other provisions of the Constitution.21 
We’ve seen this proposition in action in the recent case of City of 
Boerne v. Flores,22 which was a “necessary and proper” case through and 
through.  This case dealt with Congress’ enactment of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).23  The Congress was all for religion, and 
the bill was practically unanimously adopted in the House and the Senate.24  
 
 17 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
 18 See, e.g., United States v. Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 
U.S. 51 (1920); United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199 (1919). 
 19 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 21 See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650-51. 
 22 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 23 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1). 
 24 See 139 CONG. REC. S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H2363 (daily 
ed. May 11, 1993). 
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But no consideration was given by either house as to whether it was 
consistent with other provisions of the Constitution. 
Well, the case was argued before the Supreme Court, which decided 
that this statute was unconstitutional.25  Although the Court never explicitly 
said so, their analysis mirrors the three prongs of Chief Justice Marshall’s 
test of what is “necessary and proper.”  The Court found that the Act had 
an illegitimate end—it was trying to go enforce rights that had not been 
recognized by the Supreme Court.26  Secondly, the Court found that the Act 
lacked the proper means; it was not proportionate—there was no 
congruence between the so-called evil and the action of the Congress.27  
Thirdly, the Court found that it violated the principles of separation of 
powers and federalism, which the Court said—without great elaboration—
reflect the ultimate limitation upon the Necessary and Proper Clause.28 
It’s a remarkable decision in the sense that I had never seen a case 
before where the Court had found all three prongs of the McCulloch test 
violated in one statute.  There is a reason, perhaps, for this.  What we are 
seeing, of course, is that there’s a great deal of emphasis in Supreme Court 
opinions in case after case on the principles of federalism and separation of 
powers.29  I suggest that there is a reason why there are so many cases of 
this nature at this time in history.  Never before have there been so many 
opportunities for this Court to utilize its power to strike down legislation, 
essentially imposed on congressional action by virtue of the necessary and 
proper analysis. 
In the last ten or fifteen years, Congress has passed a lot of social 
legislation, federalizing or creating federal causes of action for social action 
for social evils that have long been dealt with, or ignored, at the state or 
local level.  For example, Congress sought to provide a civil cause of action 
for women victimized because of their gender,30 the Disabilities Act,31 and 
 
 25 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 510. The majority opinion was written by Justice 
Kennedy and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and 
Ginsberg, and joined in part by Justice Scalia. See id. Justice Stevens filed a concurring 
opinion, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part. See id. Justice 
O’Connor, joined in part by Justice Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion, and  Justice Breyer 
filed a dissenting opinion. See id. 
 26 See id. at 527. 
 27 See id. at 532-33. 
 28 See id. at 535. 
 29 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (finding that the Eleventh 
Amendment precluded Congressional authorization of suits against a state under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act as an unconstitutional extension of the Commerce Power). 
 30 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, title IV, § 40302, 
108 Stat. 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981). 
 31 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
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a host of others.  Now, one of the problems has been that the committees, 
and the Congress itself, have not seriously considered the constitutional 
repercussions of this kind of legislation.  At the same time, you will notice 
that for the past ten years in his annual message on the state of the 
judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly said, in essence: 
“Congress, will you stop federalizing all of these local criminal or civil 
situations?  It’s too much of a burden on the federal court system.”32 
I think the courts have responded to that feeling by resurrecting some 
limitations implicit in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and they are doing 
it in terms of the third prong of the McCulloch test—that the laws are not 
consistent with the other provisions in the Constitution. 
What they are saying is some of these laws are not consistent with 
federalism and separation of powers.  Those are structural underpinnings of 
the Constitution, although they are not specifically mentioned in any clause 
in the Constitution.  The Court is actively engaged in assessing many of 
these new federal statutes by use of one of these structural propositions that 
are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. 
Indeed, they are even making some changes in the concept of 
“necessary and proper.”  A good example is the recent decision in Printz v. 
United States,33 a five to four decision written by Justice Scalia.  That was 
the case involving the Brady Act,34 where certain temporary matters were 
to be assessed and executed by state and local police officers in making 
background checks for handguns until the federal government could create 
a computerized check system of its own.35 
What is interesting about Printz is that the main argument made 
before the Court on behalf of the government was that there was a national 
need to engage in this kind of regulation to combat the “national epidemic 
of handgun violence,”36 a need that satisfies the first prong of the 
McCulloch test.  The government then asserted that this regulation was 
congruent with that end, but that still leaves the third prong of the 
“necessary and proper test.” 
 
(codified in various sections of titles 29, 42, and 47 of the United States Code). 
 32 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1999 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY  § 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan00ttb/jan2000.html (visited Nov. 
13, 2000) (“[T]he ultimate safeguard for maintaining our balanced constitutional system 
must be a principled recognition by Congress for the long range damage . . . to our nation’s 
structure caused by inappropriate federalization.”). 
 33 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 34 See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 922). 
 35 See id. 
 36 Brief of Respondent at *10, 14, 28, 37, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503, 1996 WL 595005).  
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But what was the test to be this time?  Well, it turned out to be a 
significant deviation from McCulloch’s third requirement of consistency 
with the provisions of the Constitution.  Instead, Justice Scalia said, “When 
a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the 
principle of state sovereignty . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying 
into Execution’ the Commerce Clause, and is thus, in the words of The 
Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be treated 
as such.’”37 
In other words, what he is saying is we do not need to get to the third 
prong. We understand “necessary” does not mean absolutely  necessary.  
But what does “proper” mean?  “Proper,” says Justice Scalia, means 
consistency with the structural underpinnings of the Constitution.  In other 
words—and I await Joe Lynch’s next book on this point—a statute is 
“improper” or “unconstitutional” if it violates the Tenth Amendment or the 
separation of powers doctrine.  The answer of Justice Stevens, who wrote a 
dissent in Printz that was unfortunately rather skimpy,38 was that the 
operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause fully justifies this provision 
in the Brady Act because it was an execution of Congress’ power over 
interstate commerce, period.39  He violently objected to the concentration 
on the federalist proposition, but when it comes to actually referring to the 
definition of what is a “necessary and proper” law, he effectively says, 
‘that’s it—it’s the execution of the power over commerce, end of debate.’ 
Take another situation that did not get to the Supreme Court but rather 
had the Eighth Circuit examining the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,40 
not in the context of state action, but in regard to the federal bankruptcy 
laws.  The bankruptcy laws were involved because RFRA purported to 
amend every conceivable federal statute on the books, as well as being 
applicable to the states, which was the situation in the Boerne case. 
Here was a situation arising under the bankruptcy laws, a power that 
is expressly given to Congress.41  What had happened was that a religious 
person had given certain tithings to his church during the year preceding 
his bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover those tithings 
from the church.  The debtor argued that requiring him to return the tithes 
would violate RFRA’s admonition that “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the rule results 
 
 37 Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 
204 (A. Hamilton)). 
 38 See id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 39 See id. at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 40 See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 41 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
GRESSMAN FORMATTED .DOC  2/7/2001  11:42 AM 
44 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:37 
from a rule of general applicability . . . .”42  The Eighth Circuit said, this 
was before the Boerne decision, that Congress has the power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to amend the bankruptcy law without any 
further consideration.43  According to the Eighth Circuit, it was just a 
proper amendment to the Bankruptcy Act over which Congress has plenary 
authority. 
Although there was a dissent in Young,44 there was no thought given 
to understanding, let alone to adjudicating, the fact that there may be 
certain limitations on enacting or even amending a federal statute that was 
originally executed in support of an enumerated power.  This case leads to 
the frightening possibility of saying that Congress can pass an 
unconstitutional amendment to a constitutional law.  That just does not 
make sense.  That is not what the Necessary and Proper Clause was ever 
meant to authorize or permit. 
With those few thoughts in mind, I eagerly await Joe Lynch’s answer 
to this puzzle, and I hope he will do so in the not so distant future because I 
think this is a significant alteration in the meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  The alteration is the shifted emphasis away from the third 
prong of the McCulloch test and the concentration on the word “proper.”  It 
is within the word “proper” that the Court is finding these “structural” 
propositions of federalism and separation of powers, and this is what is 
supposedly giving the Court its constitutional base for all these recent 
federalism and separation of powers decisions striking down legislation. 
With those few thoughts in mind, I commend the future to Joe Lynch 




 42 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 43 See Young, 82 F.3d at 1417. 
 44 See id. at 1421 (Bogue, J., dissenting). 
